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CORPORATIONS
They cannot commit treason, nor be ... outlawed, nor excommunicate, for they have no souls.... 10 Coke la, 32b, 77
Eng. Rep. 937, 973 (K.B. 1612).-SIR

EDWARD COKE,

Case of

Sutton's Hospital.

DEVELOPMENTS IN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS1950-1960
DAVID LEVINSON AND LOUIS P. HALLER
HE FIRST STATUTE

dealing with corporations enacted in Illinois

was "An Act Concerning Corporations."' This act remained in
force until 1919 when "The General Corporation Act" was
enacted. In turn, this act was repealed by "The Business Corporation
Act."' 3 During the past ten years, prior to 1957 there were very few
amendments 4 to the Illinois Business Corporation Act.5
1111. Laws 1871-72, at 2964.
2111. Laws 1919, at 312.

a 111.Laws 1933, at 308.
4 In discussing the development of corporate law in Illinois during the past ten
years, the authors have confined themselves to the law relating to business corporations.
There will be no reference made to amendments to the Illinois Business Corporation
Act which merely change wording, rearrange sections, or are purely formal. In discussing the adjudicated cases, the authors have selected those which seem to them to be
of some importance.
5 All references to the "act" or sections thereof, unless otherwise indicated, are to
the Ill. Business Corp. Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.1-.167 (1959). Other statutory
references are, in each case, to ILL. REv. STAT. (1959).

MR. L~vINSoN,

a member of the Illinois Bar, has also been admitted to practice before

the Seventh and Eighth Circuits of the United States Court of Appeals. He received
his Ph.B. and J.D. from the University of Chicago, and is now a senior partner in the
firm of Sonnenschein, Lautman, Levinson, Rieser, Carlin & Nath, Chicago. He was a
member (for five years) of the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Character &

Fitness.
MR. HALLR, a member of the Illinois Bar, received his A.B. and J.D. from the University of Michigan. He is a former chairman of both the American Bar Association
Committee on Non-Profit Corporationsand of the Chicago Bar Association Committee
on Corporate Law. Mr. Hailer, who authored "The General Not For Profit Corporation Act, HistoricalCommentary" (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 158 to end, at xvii (SmithHurd 1954)), and co-authored the ILLINOIs BUsINESS CoupoRAroN Acr ANNrATED, is
also a partnerin the above-mentioned firm.

CORPORATIONS

1951

AMENDMENTS

In 1951, the jurisdiction of a court of equity to liquidate assets and
business of a corporation was broadened by inserting a provision in the
act, section 86 (a) (2),6 giving power to liquidate when the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and have failed for a period,
which includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect
successors to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired
upon the election of their successors. Theretofore, the corporation
could be liquidated in an action by a shareholder only (1) when the
directors were deadlocked and irreparable injury to the corporation
was being suffered or threatened by reason thereof, or (2) when the
acts of those in control were illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent, or (3)
when the corporation's assets were being misapplied or wasted.
Section 86 has been construed by the Supreme Court in Central
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 7 and in Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated
Box Co.' In the former case, holders of preferred stock of the corporation, Abraham Lincoln Hotel Company, filed representative action
asking the court to direct the sale of the assets and the liquidation of
the corporation. The acts of the controlling stockholder, Davis, were
alleged to be illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent. The hotel company had
entered into a lease with a hotel operating company, also controlled by
Davis. The court held that the plaintiffs had not brought themselves
within one of the sub-sections of section 86, which gave power to a
court of equity to liquidate a corporation under certain circumstances;
that there was no evidence of misuse of funds, and that the fact that
the income from the operations was not sufficent to show a profit
could not in and of itself justify a finding of oppression. The opinion
discussed at great length the basis for dissolution and liquidation as
authorized by the statute, and held that there was no evidence of
oppression. On review by the Supreme Court, the Appellate Court's
decision 9 was affirmed, with the statement:
The concept of oppressive conduct as a ground for dissolution of a corporation in equity appears for the first time in the 1933 act. The able briefs of
counsel have not referred us to any authoritative determination of its precise
scope.
6

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86 (a)(2) (1959).

7 10 1ll.2d 566, 141 N.E.2d 45 (1957).

820 IH.2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960).

9 Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 111.
App.2d 245, 136 N.E.2d 582 (1956).
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Plaintiff argues that the word "oppressive" does not necessarily savor of
fraud, and that the absence of "mismanagement, or misapplication of assets"
does not prevent a finding that the conduct of the defendants has been op-

pressive. We agree with that interpretation, and we reject defendants' argument that the word is substantially synonymous with "illegal" and "fraudulent." Misapplication of assets or mismanagement of funds are not, as we read
the statute, indispensable ingredients of "oppressive" conduct.' 0

In the Gidwitz case, shareholders of fifty per cent of the defendant
corporation were successful in procuring a decree of dissolution based
upon proof of what the Supreme Court held to be "oppressive" conduct. The plaintiffs had been deprived of participation in the management of the corporation, although two of them were directors. The
president, without consulting plaintiffs, and without board authorization, organized with funds of the corporation a subsidiary which lost
some $290,000 during a five-year period. There had been a ten-year
deadlock which defendants refused to break by increasing the number
of directors from four to five. The president had hired a person at a
salary of $32,500 and the promise of a car to be managing officer of the
corporation, but to serve (without title) in the capacity of executive
vice president. The president made arbitrary reductions from the salary of one of the plaintiffs, who was an officer of the corporation.
Without board approval the president borrowed moneys for the
corporation from a bank; and on two occasions borrowed moneys
from a corporation of which he was president and from a partnership
composed of the president and his two brothers. Without board authorization the president executed a proxy to himself to vote the stock
of a subsidiary corporation. The president failed for ten years to consult with directors, other than his brother, on corporate policies.
In discussing the meaning of the word "oppressive" the court said:
We have held that the word "oppressive" as used in this statute, does not
carry an essential inference of imminent disaster; it can contemplate a continuing course of conduct. The word does not necessarily savor of fraud, and
the absence of "mismanagement, or misapplication of assets," does not prevent
a finding that the conduct of the dominant directors or officers has been oppressive. Itx is not synonymous with "illegal" and "fraudulent." . . . [Citation
omitted.]"
10 Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 Ill.2d 566, 572-74, 141 N.E.2d 45, 49
(1957). It is strange that in neither the Appellate nor the Supreme Court opinion was
the theory of Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 IUl.2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793
(1960), reversing, 21 I1. App.2d 538, 159 N.E.2d 31 (1959), discussed in the text, although the transaction complained of in the Shlensky case was the leasing of property
to a corporation controlled by the dominant stockholder, which was the situation in
the Lincoln Hotel case.

11 Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 lll.2d 208, 214-15, 170 N.E.2d 131, 135
(1960).
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It is clear that Joseph Gidwitz has used his position as president of a closely
held corporation, split fifty-fifty in stock ownership between his family and
the family of plaintiffs, to completely control and manage the corporation
without majority stock support. The plaintiffs, as stockholders, have been effectively deprived of their rights and privileges. The record indicates a continuing course of conduct on the part of Joseph Gidwitz and the defendants
to seize and hold the corporate entity to the complete exclusion of plaintiffs
from their lawful right to participate in the management of Lanzit. Moreover,
plaintiffs have even been deprived of their effective power as directors and
officers of Lanzit.
The rights to which plaintiffs as officers, directors and shareholders of Lanzit
are entitled have been abused and denied. It is not necessary that fraud, illegality or even loss be shown
to exhibit oppression of plaintiffs and their in2
terest in the corporation.'

The court further said that it was unnecessary to discuss the applicability of subparagraphs one and two. It would seem that subparagraph
one was probably not applicable because of the inability to prove
irreparable injury; however, subparagraph two would seem to have
provided an almost mechanistic result. Just why the court relied on
paragraph three and one word thereof-"oppressive"-instead of subparagraph two, does not appear from the opinion.
Section 5(c) provides that each corporation shall have power to
have a corporate seal. In 1951, chapter 30, section 153b of the ILLINOIS
REVISED STATUTES was adopted, abolishing the use of private seals on
written contracts, deeds, mortgages, or other written instruments or
documents theretofore required by law to be sealed, provided, however, that the attachment of a seal to any such document shall not
affect its validity or character. In an unpublished opinion dated July
31, 1951, the Attorney General advised the Auditor of Public Accounts that the statute did not in his opinion have any force or effect
with regard to the seal of a savings and loan association, saying "the
distinction between a private seal and a corporate seal is, of course,
well established." The authors find it difficult to agree with the quoted
statement.
1953

AMENDMENT

In 1953, the Legislature adopted an act permitting foreign trust
companies to act in a fiduciary capacity (but not have an office in
Illinois) without complying with other laws of Illinois when there are
reciprocal privileges in the state of incorporation of the trust company. 13 To conform to this legislation, section 102 of the Business
12

Id. at 220, 170 N.E.2d at 138.

13 ILL. REV. STAT.

ch.

32, SS 304.1-.5 (1959).
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Corporation Act, relating to the admission of foreign corporations,
was amended to provide that no foreign corporation shall be entitled
to procure a certificate of authority under the act to act as trustee,
executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, or in any other like
fiduciary capacity. This means, in substance, that a foreign trust company may not be licensed to do business in Illinois under the Business
Corporation Act, but may, without being licensed, act in Illinois in a
fiduciary capacity where there is reciprocity.
1955 AMENDMENT

In 1955, section 5 (g), setting forth the general powers of corporations, was amended to exclude from the right to acquire securities of
other corporations the right to own or control fifteen per cent or more
of the voting shares of each of two or more banks or of a bank holding
company except as permitted by an act relating to bank holding companies,14 and except that any such corporations may continue to own
or control those voting shares which it owns or controls on the effective date of the amendment. This amendment was held to be constitutional, as was the bank holding company act itself, in Braehurn Sec.
Corp. v. Smith.'5

1957

AMENDMENTS

In 1957, a number of amendments to the Illinois Business Corporation Act were adopted, many of which were intended to bring the
act into closer conformity with the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION
ACT of the American Bar Association.' Section 2 (f) (without substantially changing the law as theretofore existing) was amended to adopt

the MODEL

ACT

definition of shares, as was section 2 (j) with reference

to the definition of treasury shares. To the latter section, however, there
was added to the Illinois Act the following language not found in the
MODEL ACT: "Shares converted into or exchanged for other shares of
the corporation shall not be deemed to be treasury shares." Section 2 (o)
added the MODEL ACT definition of insolvency as meaning inability to
pay debts as they become due in the usual course of business. Section
5(o) added to the general powers of a corporation the power "to establish pension plans, profit-sharing plans, share bonus plans, share option
14 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 161, §§ 71-76 (1959).
15 15 Ill.2d 55, 153 N.E.2d 806 (1958), petition for leave to appeal denied, 15 111.
App.2d viii (1958).
16

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, HANDBOOK A.
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plans, and other incentive plans for its directors, officers, and employees
and to make the payments and issue the shares provided for therein."
This is substantially the language of the MODEL ACT and was intended
to eliminate any question of corporate power in these respects.
In El'ward v. Peabody Coal Co., 17 a suit filed before the adoption of
section 5 (o), plaintiff asked for a declaratory judgment finding a stock
option invalid. On appeal from an order dismissing the complaint, it
appeared that stock options were granted to two employees of the
corporation, the charter having been amended to provide that shares
might be issued from time to time without first being offered to any
class of shareholders. The resolution granting the stock option was
adopted at a meeting by five (two of whom were the individuals who
had been granted stock options) out of seven of the directors. One of
these directors cancelled his option. At an annual meeting of the
shareholders, 66.15 % of the outstanding shares were voted in favor of
the option. In discussing the validity of the option, the court held that
the preemptive right of shareholders to share pro rata in any new issue
of stock is part of the common law of Illinois, and that this right may
be denied or limited by charter amendment or in the case of shares
sold to an employee, upon approval of the holders of two-thirds of the
shares. It was contended that at the date of granting the option, section
5 gave no express power to grant stock options, but the court held that
there was ample implied power in the provisions of section 5 to empower corporations to enter into contracts of employment and that
under the provisions of section 24 shareholders' preemptive rights had
been limited. However, a director of a corporation is disqualified from
voting on a resolution giving him an option to buy stock, and in this
case, the directors' resolution was not adopted by a qualified majority
of directors. Regardless of the approval of the option by the shareholders, the option was held to be invalid because it granted the right
to buy common shares of the par value of five dollars each at three
dollars per share in contravention of section 17. The fact that stockholders of but 66.15% of the outstanding shares approved the options
was not mentioned!
Section 4 of the act, relating to unified local transportation corporations, was repealed as no longer necessary, and language in section 3,
relating to the organization of corporations for this purpose, was eliminated.
17 9

Ill. App.2d 234, 132 N.E.2d 549 (1956).
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Section 6, concerning the power of the corporation to acquire its
own shares (in general, only out of earned surplus, but in certain special situations notwithstanding this limitation), was amended to make
clear that no purchase of its own shares shall be made at a time when
the corporation is insolvent or if any such purchase would render the
corporation insolvent.
Until 1957, no express provision had been made for the vacation of
office by a registered agent. Section 1la was added to the act to cover
the resignation of the registered agent of a domestic corporation and
section 109a contained a similar provision with reference to registered
agents of foreign corporations.
Section 14(b), which had permitted the creation of preferred shares
entitled to cumulative or noncumulative dividends, was amended to
provide that such dividends might also be partially cumulative.
Section 21, in addition to permitting the use on a share certificate of
a seal or facsimile thereof which had been changed before the certificate
was issued, was also amended to add as an alternative to the requirement that the certificate set forth a full or summary statement of the
preferences and special rights of each class of shares and of each series,
a provision that such statement may be omitted from the certificate if
it shall be set forth on the face or back of the certificate that such
statement in full will be furnished by the corporation to any shareholder upon request and without charge.
The amendment to section 22 permits a corporation to pay cash
equal to the value of a fractional share in lieu of issuing scrip, and
where scrip is issued, permits its sale by an agent on behalf of the
holder thereof, as well as by the corporation.
The preemptive right of a shareholder to acquire additional shares
except as limited or denied in the articles of incorporation was expressly made applicable by amendment to such additional shares "whether
then or thereafter authorized," and this language was carried into section 47 (k), setting forth the provisions of the articles of incorporation.
The same amendment provided that the consideration fixed for par
value shares offered to shareholders whether or not pursuant to preemptive rights may be in excess of the par value of shares.
Section 27, relating to notice, and section 29, involving the closing
of transfer books and the fixing of the record date, were amended to
conform to the requirement (theretofore overlooked) that in the case
of a merger or consolidation, the notice must be not less than twenty
days before the date of the meeting.
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Section 31, relating to a quorum of shareholders, adds the MODEL
provision: "If a quorum is present, the affirmative vote of the
majority of the shares represented at the meeting shall be the act of the
shareholders, unless the vote of a greater number or voting by classes
is required by this Act or the articles of incorporation or by-laws."
Section 33 was amended to provide that the articles of incorporation, as well as the by-laws, may prescribe qualifications for directors.
There was also added to this section a provision following largely the
Wisconsin Act18 that "unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or by-laws, the board of directors, by the affirmative vote
of a majority of the directors then in office, and irrespective of any
personal interest of any of its members, shall have authority to establish reasonable compensation of all directors for services to the corporation as directors, officers, or otherwise." The language added eliminates any doubt as to the validity of such action by directors and confines any question to the reasonableness of the compensation.
Section 37 was amended so as to fix a quorum of directors at a
majority of the total number of places on the board and not a majority
of the directors then in office, unless a greater number is required by
the articles of incorporation or by-laws.
An extensive amendment to section 38, concerning the appointment
and powers of the executive committee, was adopted. Theretofore,
the act had permitted the executive committee to have the authority
ACT

of the board "in the management of the corporation. .. ."19 There was

some question whether this language granted to the executive committee authority such as the board had been given by a statute to
amend the articles, adopt a plan of merger or consolidation, recommend sale, lease, mortgage, or other disposition of all of the corporate
property, recommend voluntary dissolution or revocation thereof,
amend or repeal the by-laws, elect or remove officers or members of
the executive committee, fix compensation of any member of the executive committee, or declare dividends, and the amendment definitely answered this question in the negative.
Section 41b was added to forbid loans by a corporation to its officers
or directors and also loans secured by its own shares. Loans to officers
or directors had theretofore been forbidden by implication from section 42 (d), which made any director assenting to such a loan liable to
18 Wis. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,

19 Il.Laws 1945, at 544.

ch. 180.30 (1957).
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the corporation for its repayment. One important purpose of the provision forbidding loans secured by the corporation's own shares is to
eliminate the evasion of the provisions of section 18 that promissory
notes shall not constitute payment for the shares of the corporation.
The amendment to section 44, striking out the words "elected or
appointed by the board of directors, ' 20 broadened the power of the
board to remove an officer or agent of the corporation.
Section 45a was added to provide that no representative action shall
be brought in this state by a shareholder of a domestic or foreign
corporation unless the plaintiff was the holder of shares or of voting
trust certificates therefore at the time of the transaction of which he
complains or thereafter received them by operation of law from a person who was a holder at such time.
In Duncan v. National Tea Co.,2 an action instituted prior to the
adoption of section 45a, the court held that in a derivative suit the plaintiff does not sue in an individual capacity, but as the representative of the
corporation, and the decree is for the benefit of all shareholders except
those who had actively participated in the wrong. A shareholder who
acquired his shares after the occurrence of alleged acts of mismanagement is not barred from suing, if the alleged mismanagement and its
effects continue and are injurious to him. 2
The procedure with reference to the amendments to the articles of
incorporation as set forth in sections 52, 53, 54, 55, and 57 was
amended to permit the restatement in a single instrument of the provisions of the articles of incorporation as then constituted or as further
amended by such restatement, and the definition of "articles of incorporation" in section 2 (c) was amended to include restated articles.
Section 58 was amended to prevent a reduction in stated capital in
connection with the redemption or purchase and cancellation of a
corporation's own shares until a report thereof had been filed.
Section 61, relating to merger, and section 62, relating to consolidation of corporations, added subsections providing that the plan might
set forth provisions under which the proposed merger or consolidation
20 111. Laws 1957, at 2192.
21

14 111. App.2d 280, 144 N.E.2d 771 (1957), Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 546 (1957).

22 See also Lampropulus v. Kedzie Ogden Bldg. Corp., 4 ll.2d 32, 122 N.E.2d 181
(1954), which held that a stockholder is bound by the action of the former owner
of his shares and cannot complain of actions which had been consented to or participated in by his predecessor owner. The Lampropulus decision relied on Babcock v.

Farwell, 245 I1.14,91 NE. 683 (1910).
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might be abandoned prior to the filing of the articles by the Secretary
of State.
Sections 70 and 73, setting forth the rights of dissenting shareholders, were each amended to provide that shares acquired from the
dissenting shareholder may be held and disposed of by the corporation
as in the case of other treasury shares.
Section 147, which had permitted action by the shareholders without a meeting by signing a consent in writing, was amended to provide
expressly that such consent shall have the same force and effect as a
unanimous vote of the shareholders and may be stated as such in any
articles of incorporation or other document filed with the Secretary of
State.
Section 35 was repealed in 1957 as a result of the decision in Wolfson v. Avery.23 In that case, the election of directors of Montgomery
Ward and Company in 1955 precipitated the filing of the complaint
by a shareholder seeking a declaratory judgment that section 35 of the
Illinois Business Corporation Act, which purported to authorize the
classification of directors into not more than three classes with the
election of only one class annually, was unconstitutional and void, and
that the company's by-law adopted pursuant thereto was therefore
unlawful. Montgomery Ward had a board of nine directors divided
into three classes of three each. A judgment as prayed in the complaint
was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Hershey dissenting. The constitutional provision in question is section 3 of article
XI of the

ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION,

which reads:

The general assembly shall provide, by law, that in all elections for directors
or managers of incorporated companies, every stockholder shall have the right
to vote, in person or by proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned by
him, for as many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected, or to
cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the number of
directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock shall equal, or to
distribute them on the same principle among as many candidates as he shall
think fit; and such directors or managers shall not be elected in any other
24
manner.

The court upheld the contention that the purpose of the constitutional provision is to give minority shareholders the right to proportional representation on corporation boards, and brushed aside the
contention that the purpose is to give minorities some representation,
and that the corporation may reduce the number of its directors from
Ill.2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
24 ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3. (Emphasis added.)
23 6
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nine to three without violating any constitutional or statutory revision,
in which event the number of shares required to elect a single director
would be increased. The court also held, largely on the basis of extrinsic
evidence consisting of statements made at the constitutional convention and in newspapers published at the time, that the words "to be
elected" in the constitutional provision did not indicate that less than
all directors might be elected at one time, but that the constitutional
provisions required that the whole number of directors be elected at
one time.
Apparently the majority opinion gave no consideration to interpreting the constitutional provision in the light of the ordinary meaning of
the language used, that is to say, that each shareholder may give to one
candidate as many votes as the number of directors (that is, the total
number on the board-in this case, nine) multiplied by the number of
his shares of stock shall equal, or that he may distribute them on the
same principle among as many candidates as he shall think fit, and that
the number of votes thus given to the shareholder should be cast for or
distributed among the directors to be elected (in this case, three). This
interpretation would be consistent with the approval given by a Chicago newspaper 25 (relied on in other respects in the majority opinion)
to the Corporation Act of 1872,26 which act-adopted immediately
after the constitutional provision became effective-provided for classification of directors.
While it is true, as was contended by the complainant in this case,
that dividing a board of nine into three classes of three each may deprive a minority shareholder able to elect one director out of nine (at
an election of nine) of the right to elect any directors, it is to be noted
that in some cases, if this construction were followed, the minority
would profit from having staggered elections. To take a simple case,
assume a corporation with 100 shares of stock-26 owned by one person and 74 by another-and a board of nine directors. The owner of 26
shares of stock is able to cast 117 votes for each of two directors or 78
votes for each of three directors. The owner of 74 shares may, however, cast 95 votes for each of seven directors. At an election of a
board of nine, the minority shareholder may therefore elect only two.
If, however, the board is divided into the three classes of three each, at
every election the owner of 26 shares is able to cast 78 votes for one
2.

The Chicago Tribune, April 5, 6, 1872.

26111. Laws 1871-1872, at 2964.
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director and the owner of 74 shares would be able to cast only 74 votes
for each of three, and therefore at each election, the minority shareholder would be able to elect one out of three, with the net result that
he would eventually be represented by three directors out of nine instead of two out of nine.
1959

AMENDMENTS

In 1959, section 29, relating to the closing of transfer books and the
fixing of the record date, was amended by adding a sentence reading as
follows: "When a determination of shareholders entitled to vote at
any meeting of shareholders has been made as provided in this section,
such determination shall apply to any adjournment thereof."
A number of bills were drafted by the Corporation Division of the
Office of the Secretary of State to simplify procedure and eliminate
difficulties that had arisen over the years in connection with documents filed in his office. These included more or less formal amendments to sections 13, 55, 95, 97, 107, 109a, 115 and 165.
SinclairPipe Line Co. v. Carpentier,7 involved the constitutionality
of the sections of the act relating to annual franchise tax and increased
license fee. The facts, either stipulated or admitted by the pleadings,
disclosed that Sinclair was a Delaware corporation whose principal
office was in Kansas, and that in 1952 it qualified to do business in Illinois as a corporation for the purpose of building, owning, and operating pipe lines, etc. Following its qualification and prior to 1935, it acquired lands and easements by eminent domain proceedings in order to
accomplish its purpose. By January 1955, it owned and operated three
pipe line systems originating in, and transversing Illinois, which were
used solely for the transportation of oil through Illinois into Missouri.
As an adjunct to its pipe lines, Sinclair maintained and operated communication systems by wire or radio and also had seven pumping stations at various sites along the three lines. These facilities were operated and maintained by seventy-three employees, all of whom were
paid from the Kansas office. It was stipulated that Sinclair engaged in
no intrastate business, and that all its activities and property in Illinois
were devoted exclusively to the business of transporting oil or oil
products in interstate commerce. The question involved was the payment of franchise tax and a small additional license fee for 1955. The
tax and fee were required by the applicable sections to be assessed
27 10 I11.2d 300, 140 N.E.2d 115 (1957).
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upon the amount of stated capital and paid-in surplus represented in
Illinois by that proportion of the sum of the stated capital and paid-in
surplus which the sum of the value of the property located in this state,
and the gross amount of business transacted by it at or from places of
business in this state bore to the sum of the value of all of its property
wherever located, and the gross amount of its business wherever transacted.
The latter formula had been approved by the Illinois Supreme
Court2 1 and the United States Supreme Court 29 as applied to foreign
corporations engaged both in intrastate and interstate commerce in
Illinois. Sinclair contended that it had paid an initial license fee at the
time it qualified to do business in Illinois, but that it did no local or
intrastate business, and was engaged exclusively in interstate commerce
in Illinois in 1955, and was not liable for the franchise tax or additional
license fee which had been assessed for that year. The Secretary of
State advised Sinclair that the franchise tax would have to be paid unless Sinclair could withdraw from the state by filing an application
prior to July 1, 1955. An application for withdrawal, however, must
set forth "that no portion of its issued shares is on the date of such
application represented by business transacted or property located in
this State," 30 and the Secretary of State refused to accept a modified
form of withdrawal which added that the business was exclusively in
interstate commerce and that the property was used exclusively in
interstate commerce. Thereupon Sinclair paid the franchise tax and
additional license fee under protest and commenced an action seeking
a refund. The first question upon which the court passed was whether
the franchise tax provided for in the act is imposed upon the privilege
granted to a corporation to exist or to exercise its corporate functions
in Illinois, or whether it is imposed upon the exercise of such privilege.
The State contended that the corporation was liable whether or not
the privilege was exercised. The court, holding that a distinction obtains between a license fee exacted for the privilege of doing business
in the state and a franchise tax levied upon the exercise of the privilege
granted, could find no basis for holding that all assessments have been
lifted from the exercise of the privilege and tacked upon the granting
of the privilege, and held that consequently no liability for franchise
28
Western Cartridge Co. v. Emmerson, 335 Ii. 150, 166 N.E. 501 (1929), aff'd, 281
U.S. 511 (1930).
29 Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U.S. 290 (1922).
a0 Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Carpentier, 10 111.2d 300, 307, 140 N.E.2d 115, 118 (1957).
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tax could be said to have resulted from the mere granting of such unexercised privilege.
The court was next concerned with the question of whether or not
the franchise tax may be imposed upon a foreign corporation when its
privilege of doing business in the state is exercised exclusively in interstate commerce. The court reviewed the existing decisions, finding
that the question was not entirely free from doubt, but holding that a
franchise tax upon a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce is unconstitutional under the commerce clause.
The court also held that Sinclair could not properly withdraw from
the state while admitting that it owned property in the state even
though all such property was devoted exclusively to interstate commerce.
As a result of the Sinclair case, the Corporation Division of the
Office of the Secretary of State drafted and caused to be introduced an
amendment to section 135, inserting the words "for the privilege of
exercising its authority to transact such business in this State as set out
in its application therefor or any amendment thereto" before the
words "the Secretary of State shall charge and collect from each foreign corporation the following license fees . . . ," and inserting the
same language in section 138 before the words "each foreign corporation shall pay to the Secretary of State the following franchise
taxes ..... " Similar language was also inserted at the beginning of sections 128 and 131, covering license fees and franchise taxes payable by
domestic corporations.
There is considerable doubt, particularly on the question of constitutionality, as to whether or not the Secretary of State has accomplished what he sought to accomplish by these amendments. Unfortunately, at the same session of the Legislature, the Secretary of State
caused another bill to be introduced which amended sections 131 and
138 in the same manner, and which also amended these two sections as
well as sections 132 (basis for computation of franchise taxes payable
by domestic corporations) and 139 (basis for computation of franchise
taxes payable by foreign corporations) to provide that if a merger or
consolidation becomes effective on or after January first and before
July first of any year, the surviving or new corporation shall be liable
for a further additional franchise tax (1) on the increased amount
represented in this state of the resulting stated capital and paid-in surplus of the surviving corporation over the amount of its stated capital
and paid-in surplus immediately prior to the merger, in the case of a
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merger; or (2) on that portion represented in this state of the total
stated capital and paid-in surplus of the new corporation, in the case of
a consolidation. The additional tax is imposed, in either case, only on
that part of the designated amount on which no annual franchise tax
is paid or would otherwise be payable for the year commencing July
first following said merger or consolidation, and on which no additional franchise tax is otherwise payable under the act. The corresponding
amendment to sections 138 and 139 related only to mergers after January first, and not to consolidations. This bill was also enacted by the
Legislature and signed by the Governor, with the result that there are
two versions of sections 131 and 138.31
The Legislature in 1959 also enacted the Uniform Gift to Minors
Act, 32 which provides, among other things, that the custodian may

vote, in person or by general or limited proxy, a security which is
custodial property.3
CASE LAW

CHANGES

4

INTERFERENCE WITH INTERNAL AFFAIRS

In Continental-Midwest Corp. v. Hotel Sherman, Inc.,35 a minority
stockholder of Hotel Sherman, Inc., a Delaware corporation, all of the
property of which was in Illinois and which transacted no business
elsewhere, filed a representative action to enjoin the corporation from
purchasing, acquiring, or exchanging shares of its stock, declaring dividends unless current assets exceeded current liabilities, contracting to
merge with other corporations, and voting shares of its stock owned
by a subsidiary, Ambassador East, Inc., also a Delaware corporation.
The action of the chancellor with respect to all but the last portion,
namely, the voting by the subsidiary (Ambassador East, Inc.) of
shares of its parent (Hotel Sherman, Inc.), was reversed on the ground
that the chancellor had abused his discretion in substituting his judg81The cases passing upon the effect of more than one amendment of a section in
the same session of the Legislature are People ex rel. Schlaegar v. Mattes, 396 Ill. 348,
71 N.E.2d 690 (1947); S. Buchsbaum & Co., v. Gordon, 389 Ill. 493, 59 N.E.2d 832
(1945); People ex rel. Martin v. Village of Oak Park, 372 Ill. 488, 24 N.E.2d 571 (1939);

People ex rel. Hines v. Baltimore & 0. S. W. R.R., 366 I11.318, 8 N.E.2d 655 (1937).
32 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, S§531-41 (1959).
83 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 534(f) (1959).
34 From this point forward the authors discuss what seem to them to be the important decisions handed down during the decade being considered.

35 13 11I.App.2d 188, 141 N.E.2d 400 (1957).
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ment for that of the board of directors of the corporation, there having been no charge of fraud, oppression, or insolvency.
Hotel Sherman, Inc. owned approximately eighty per cent of the
shares of Ambassador East, Inc. Ambassador East, Inc. owned twenty
per cent of the shares of Hotel Sherman, Inc. This anomalous situation
grew out of the reorganization of the predecessor of Hotel Sherman,
Inc. by action of the Bankruptcy Court in 1937.
So much of the decision of the Appellate Court as reversed the
chancellor, is justified by precedent and needs no discussion. However,
in affirming the chancellor's injunction restraining the voting by the
subsidiary of the shares of its parent, the court disregarded section 102
of the act:
• . . A foreign corporation shall not be denied a certificate of authority by
reason of the fact that the laws of the state under which such corporation is
organized governing its organization and internal affairs differ from the laws
of this State, and nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to authorize this State to regulate the organization or the internal affairs of such
6
corporation.3

This language was incorporated in the statute for the first time in 1933.
The discussion in the ILLINOIS BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNO-

(2d ed.), edited by THE CORPORATION LAW COMMITTEE OF
CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION, states in effect that the principle of

TATED
THE

the statutory enactment was theretofore established by a number of
decisions. Whether or not this is so is now of no importance, except
perhaps to aid in the construction of the language used in the statute,
but the Appellate Court relied on Babcock v. Farwell,7 which ob-

viously was decided prior to the change in the statute. Quite obviously,
the court gave no effect to the statute or the opinions, which it is said
state the same principle.
There is an apparent contradiction in the court's opinion when it
refers to "jurisdiction," and this is not an uncommon difficulty.
Obviously, the court held that the chancellor had jurisdiction (power
to decide) the matter, but that it had abused its power, although the
following is difficult to square with even this explanation:
Under the facts in this case, where all the actions complained of took place
in Illinois, all the corporate assets are located in Illinois, all corporate business
is done in Illinois, and all officers and directors reside in Illinois, it would be
unjust to remand plaintiff to the courts of Delaware. We think justice, ex30 ILL. REg. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.102 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
37 245 Ill. 14,91 N.E. 683 (1910).
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pediency, and the policy of Illinois compel the conclusion that the Chancellor
through undue interference in the affairs of the
did not abuse his discretion
38
Delaware corporations.

The statute contains nothing about undue interference. It prohibits the
regulation of the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. Whether the
subsidiary should or should not be permitted to vote shares of stock of
its parent owned by it is certainly a matter of internal affairs. Later in
the opinion, the court stated, after holding that Delaware law did not
prohibit the payment of dividends when the current liabilities exceeded the current assets, and that in the absence of any fraud, oppression, or insolvency, there was no question but what the payment
of dividends should be left to the honest decision of the directors:
It is unfair to implicitly restrain the power of the majority stock held in the
voting trust which is unaffected by the question of the legality of Ambassador
voting Sherman stock. For this reason, we think the Chancellor abused his
discretion in restraining the payment of dividends and that part of the order
is invalid.
What we have said about the payment of dividends applies with equal force
to the purchase of outstanding stock of Sherman .... The same is true of that
part of the order restraining mergers.39
REDEMPTION PRICE OF PREFERRED STOCK

Bowman v. Armour & Co.,40 involved a plan of recapitalization
amending the articles of incorporation by changing the provisions for
redemption of the prior preferred stock of Armour and Company.
The stock had a stated value of $100 per share and could be redeemed
at $115 per share plus accumulated dividends. The plan of recapitalization provided that the prior preferred might be redeemed at $120
per share, payable in debentures of like principal amount subordinated
to other indebtedness of the company, and transferable warrants for
the purchase of one common share of the company at a price to be
determined by the directors. Section 52 provides that articles of incorporation may be amended to change the relative rights and preferences of all or any part of the corporate shares, but also provides that
the articles of incorporation, as amended, shall contain only such provisions as might lawfully be contained in the original articles of incorporation. Section 14(a) provides for the issuance of preferred shares
88 Continental-Midwest Corp. v. Hotel Sherman, Inc., 13 Ill. App.2d 188, 193, 141
N.E.2d 400, 402 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
39 Id. at 197, 141 N.E.2d at 404.
40

17 l.2d 43, 160 N.E.2d 753 (1959).
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which may be redeemed "at not exceeding the price fixed by the
articles of incorporation. .. ." The court held that the word "price" as
used in the statute means money and not bonds or other evidences of
debt, and that the status of the holders of prior preferred stock cannot
be changed into that of creditors, even though the amendment was
approved by a vote of more than two-thirds of each class of outstanding stock.
Another example of strict construction of a provision of the statute
is Odd Fellows Oak Ridge Cemetery Ass'n v. Oak Ridge Cemetery
Corp.4 An Illinois corporation organized under the general Corporation Act of 1872 was required to dispose of unneeded real estate,42 notwithstanding the adoption of the Business Corporation Act of 1933,
which permits corporations to be organized with power to deal in real
estate without limitation.13 The more liberal attitude is found in Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Production Press, Inc.44 There it was held that a
corporation organized under the Business Corporation Act of 1919," 5
which provided that a change in the number of directors could only
be made by amendment of the articles of incorporation, could, after the
enactment of the Business Corporation Act of 1933-which provides in
section 34 that the number of directors may be increased or decreased
by amendment to the by-laws, and in section 25 that the power to
make or amend the by-laws shall be vested in the board of directors
unless reserved to the shareholders by the articles of incorporationincrease the number of directors by adoption of an amendment to the
by-laws.
RIGHT OF DISSENT AND COURT APPRAISAL NOT EXCLUSIVE REMEDY

In Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc.,4" it was alleged that at a special
meeting of the stockholders of Eastgate called by its directors, the
corporation was authorized to sell its property to one Benjamin F.
Fohrman, for $550,000. Plaintiff's theory was that the defendants, by
doubling expenditures for repairs and maintenance and otherwise making it appear that the property was not profitable had acquired two414 111.App.2d 378, 144 N.E.2d 853 (1957).
42 111.Laws

1872, at 2964.

43 Ill. Laws 1933, at 310.

15 M. App.2d 50, 145 N.E.2d 276 (1957).
45 Ill. Laws 1919, at 312.
46347 11. App. 261, 106 N.E.2d 848 (1952).
44
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thirds voting control of Eastgate in order to accomplish their objective, namely, the sale to Fohrman at an inadequate price, the sale merely being for the benefit of the controlling syndicate. The court found
that the offer was grossly inadequate. In recommending the sale of corporate assets and submitting it to a vote of shareholders, the directors
are trustees of all of the shareholders and while the majority shareholders do not, by mere reason of their holdings, become trustees for
the minority shareholders in voting on a sale of assets, equity will impose upon them the obligation of trustees if in forcing disposition of
assets they overreach the minority shareholders and reap benefits in
which the minority does not share. In actions of fraud against those
not occupying a fiduciary relation, the fraud must be proved by those
asserting it, but in actions against fiduciaries, as in sales of corporate
property to directors, which are presumptively fraudulent, the burden
is on the fiduciary to prove affirmatively compliance with equitable
requisites to overcome the presumption of fraud. Directors of a corporation cannot purchase from themselves, and the rule has been applied
to the extent that majority stockholders cannot overreach minority
stockholders in authorizing a sale to themselves or to one who represents them. Defendants contended that under section 73, dissenting
stockholders are limited to filing a written demand for the fair value
of their shares within the time and with the effect set forth in said
section. The court held that the provisions of section 73 do not furnish
an exclusive remedy where, as here, charges of fraud and illegality are
involved. Section 73 provides an adequate remedy where the dissenting stockholder's only complaint is the inadequacy of the price received and the only claim is money damages-the fair value of his
shares. It is not a full and adequate remedy where fraud is charged, and
in such case, the court may go beyond the mere assessment of damages
and rescind the sale.
FRANCHISE TAX

OF FOREIGN CORPORATION

The plaintiff in U.S. Borax & Chemical Corp. v. Carpentier47 was
a Nevada corporation licensed to do business in Illinois. It had elected
in its annual report filed in February 1956, to pay its franchise tax for
the year beginning July 1, 1956, upon its entire stated capital and paidin surplus. It was agreed between the parties that if plaintiff had
elected to pay the franchise tax on the basis of the property located
47 14I11.2d 111, 150 N.E.2d 818 (1958).
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within, and business transacted at or from places of business within the
State of Illinois in accordance with section 139 of the Business Corporation Act, the ratio of property and business in Illinois would have
been 93.57%. In May and June of 1956, plaintiff increased its aggregate stated capital and paid-in surplus from approximately $120,000 to
$49,000,000. As of July 2, 1956, plaintiff was party to a merger, as a
result of which its stated capital and paid-in surplus were increased by
more than $4,000,000. Subsequent to these transactions, less than two
per cent of the plaintiff's property and business was located in or
transacted from places within the State of Illinois.
On June 30, 1956, the changes in stated capital and paid-in surplus
were reported to the Secretary of State of Illinois, and plaintiff also
filed an amended annual report and a report of change in capital and
surplus as a result of the merger and of its obligation to issue additional
shares on July 2, 1956. The Secretary of State was upheld in his contention that under section 139, no amended annual report could be
filed after June 25, 1956, and as a result, the franchise tax was based
upon plaintiff's election in its annual report to be taxed upon its entire
stated capital and paid-in surplus.
In passing upon the contention that a state may not compel a foreign
corporation to submit to a tax based solely upon its interstate business
or property located outside of the state, the court held that it is not
per se unconstitutional to include some out-of-state property or business so long as the formula used to determine the tax basis has the purpose of arriving at a fair conclusion as to the value of intrastate business of a corporation. The plaintiff had failed to file an amended
annual report within the period limited by section 139. Had it consummated its merger before July 1, 1956, it might again, under that
section, have limited its additional franchise tax to the portion of property reported in Illinois, as shown by the articles of merger. Having
failed to do this, and having elected in its annual report to pay its tax
on the basis of its entire stated capital and paid-in surplus, the corporation was estopped from claiming otherwise.
It is to be noted that the annual report, as provided in section
115 (1), must set forth the proportion of property and business in Illinois as of December 31st of the preceding year, and that in the U.S.
Borax case had it not been for the merger, the portion allocated to
Illinois would have been 93.57%. The court held that the issue as to
whether or not plaintiff might have had a remedy under these circum-
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stances was purely speculative and not presented by the facts of the
case.
Jorgensen v. Baker"8 held that under section 142, a corporation
which is delinquent in the payment of franchise taxes, but has started a
suit, may, by subsequent compliance with the statute, continue the
prosecution of the suit. This rule, however, does not apply when the
statute of limitations has run before the corporation reacquires the
right to use the courts of this state.
EXTENSION OF THE VOTING TRUST

Section 30a, added to the act in 1947, provides that any number of
shareholders of a corporation may create a voting trust for a period of
not exceeding ten years. There is no provision for extension.
Thomas v. 4145 Broadway Hotel Co.4" held that although an amendment of a stock voting trust agreement extending the duration of the
trust was invalid, and the trust terminated on an earlier date specified
in the original agreement, it was entirely lawful for the owners of trust
shares to voluntarily permit the trustees to continue to remain the
registered owners of ninety-nine per cent of the shares of stock and to
vote the shares in accordance with the express provisions of the trust
certificates and the trust agreement. It is to be noted that in this case
the plaintiff had waited until almost two and one-half years after the
extension was declared effective before instituting suit, and in the
meantime had acquiesced in the actions of the trustees by accepting
the benefits of substantial liquidating dividends declared by the trustees.
Oppenheimer v. Cassidy,50 involved an agreement by holders of a
majority of shares issued under a voting trust created in connection
with a plan for reorganization of a corporation to extend the duration
of the trust for an additional ten years. This agreement, the court held,
did not violate section 30a. Upon termination of the original voting
trust, shareholders had a right to enter into an agreement between
themselves to extend the trust or to make a new voting trust agreement
with the same provisions as the expired trust, and such agreement,
whether called an extension of the voting trust, or a new voting trust,
was binding on only those who agreed to be bound.
48 21111. App.2d 196, 157 N.E.2d 773 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 962 (1960).
49 342 I1. App. 308,96 N.E.2d 655 (1950).
50 345 111. App. 212, 102 N.E.2d 678 (1951).
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THE

EXECUTIVE

COMMITTEE

The president of a corporation, being disqualified as a director from
voting on a resolution to grant himself additional compensation for
services rendered to the corporation, attempted to accomplish his ends
by designating an executive committee. The by-laws authorized the
creation of a committee composed of men to be selected by the president of the corporation, and the members selected by the president
were not directors of the corporation. The court in Steigerald v.
A. M. Steigerwald CoY held that the by-laws were not in compliance
with section 38, which required that the members of the executive
committee be selected by the directors, and that all members of the
executive committee be directors.
POWERS OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS

Sacks v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 52 held that the president of a
corporation has no implied authority to make a contract on its behalf
which is unusual and extraordinary. And a contract to pay as compensation a percentage of the profits of the corporation is not the usual
and ordinary contract which one authorized to employ on behalf of
the corporation may make without specific authority. A similar conclusion was reached in Goodman v. Motor Prods. Corp.,53 in spite of
the fact that the extraordinary contract had been in effect for more than
ten years. There, the agent of the defendant corporation had given the
plaintiff an oral exclusive sales and distribution contract to sell food
freezers manufactured by the defendant corporation under the trade
name of "Deepfreeze" in territory outside the United States. The
agreement required plaintiff to give up his other business ventures, and
was to continue so long as he devoted his full time and attention to the
selling and distribution of these electrical appliances. The agreement
granted him the right to set up corporations containing the word
"Deepfreeze" in their names so long as they did not handle a competing product. The court held that the agent had no express authority
to give away the corporation's property and that there was no implied
authority in a department head or even a general manager to contract
to give another an interest in his principal's property or business.
While the contract had been in effect for more than ten years, it was
519111. App.2d 31, 132 N.E.2d 373 (1955).
52 340111. App. 76,91 N.E.2d 127 (1950).
53 9 111. App.2d 57, 132 N.E.2d 356 (1956).
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denied that its extraordinary terms and conditions had ever been
brought to the attention of the officers or directors of the defendant
corporation.
DIVIDENDS ON NON-CUMULATIVE

PREFERRED

Illinois Central R.R.,"4

In Guttmann v.
the court assumed for the
sake of argument that the standard of discretion in waiving the propriety of the non-declaration of dividends on non-cumulative preferred
stock is far stricter than in the case of the non-declaration of dividends
on common stock. It held, nevertheless, that in the case of an Illinois
corporation where the net earnings for a given year are legitimately
retained for any one of a variety of corporate purposes, the directors
have not abused their discretion in not declaring dividends on noncumulative preferred and have no power in subsequent years to declare dividends for the years in question. (In the Guttmann case, defendant's net income in each year from 1937 to 1947 inclusive exceeded the annual dividend on the non-cumulative preferred shares,
but no dividends for those years were ever declared. In 1948 to 1950
inclusive, the directors declared a dividend on the preferred stock for
each such year, and in 1950, also declared a dividend on the common
stock.)
THE RIGHT TO A LIST OF SHAREHOLDERS

The president of the corporation who was the owner of seventy
per cent of its stock used the stockholders' list to submit to the stockholders an offer of fifty dollars per share. The plaintiff in Crouse v.
Rogers Park Apartments, Inc.,51 was the owner of five shares. Upon
receiving the offer, she requested the stockholders' list for the purpose
of offering sixty dollars per share to all stockholders. The president
refused to give her the list. A stockholder seeking to examine the
books and records of a corporation must allege and prove a proper purpose under section 45. A proper purpose is one in which the stockholder seeks information bearing upon the protection of his interest
and that of other stockholders. In this case, the court said that the
stockholder did not appear to be a speculator, since she had purchased
54

189 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867 (1951), Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d

1066 (1953).
55 343 11. App. 319, 99 N.E.2d 404 (1951), petition for leave to appeal denied, 346 Ill.

App. xiv (1952).
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her stock about three years before she received the president's offer;
but the court added, that even assuming there was speculation on her
part, the president could not use the stockholders' list to do his own
trading and deny it to other stockholders.
The right of an individual director of a corporation to have a copy
of auditor's reports regardless of whether executive officers wish such
director to have a copy, was upheld in Kunin v. ForemanRealty Corp.6
CORPORATE MINUTES

Field v. Oberwortmann 7 held that the secretary of a corporation
is under obligation to keep the minutes faithfully, but is not obligated
to include everything that is said, as long as he transcribes accurately
what has taken place.
A SHAREHOLDER'S DERIVATIVE ACTION

While a demand on the board of directors of an Illinois corporation
is a condition precedent to a shareholder's filing a derivative action
on behalf of the corporation, the board's refusal to act does not in
itself clear the way for suit, and if a board, a majority of which are
admittedly honest and have not been involved in the alleged wrongs,
refuses a demand to bring suit, the complaining shareholder has no
standing to commence a derivative suit.58
TERM OF OFFICE OF A DIRECTOR

A corporation with four directors had held no election of directors
for several years. Three of the four directors resigned, and a meeting
was called to fill the vacancies caused by their resignations. The holders of sixty per cent of the stock of the corporation nominated three
directors, who were unanimously elected. If an election had been
held for four directors, the holders of sixty per cent of the stock
would not have been able to elect three of the four if there had been
five candidates for the four directorships, since the result would have
been a deadlock. Under section 34 and the by-laws, the terms of all
directors had expired, and therefore no director could be elected to
fill the vacancy for the unexpired term of his predecessor, as provided
56 21 IMI.App.2d 221, 157 N.E.2d 785 (1959), petition for leave to appeal denied, 17
Ill.2d 543,162 N.E.2d 401 (1959).
57 16 Ill. App.2d 376, 148 N.E.2d 600 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 833 (1958).
58 Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957).
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in section 36. The court in Levin v. Hunter"9 held that there should
have been an election of four directors, but the stockholders, having
freely participated in the election of three directors, were bound
thereby, and equity would not aid them to force a deadlock and dissolution on the majority stockholders.
MINORITY VS.

MAJORITY

SHAREHOLDERS

The corporation involved in Hyman v. Velsicol Corp.,6 ° had been
organized to exploit inventions of a minority shareholder who had
been general manager from the inception of the corporation, but had
resigned as vice president, manager, and director, and had taken about
thirty of the corporation's fifty technical employees with him to
establish a competing corporation. At a shareholders meeting of which
the minority shareholder had notice, resolutions for a recapitalization
program were approved by the requisite vote and there was no recommendation of a substitute plan although the minority shareholder
was represented at the meeting by an attorney as his proxy. The
majority plan decreased the par value of the corporation's stock from
one hundred to ten dollars per share, and increased the number of
shares from 200 to 2,000. The charter amendment authorized 100,000
shares of eommon stock of ten dollars par value, and the plan authorized the issuance of 68,000 additional shares to be paid for at par in
cash or by credit against sums owed by the corporation on outstanding notes, the period within which payment was to be made being
approximately ten days. The minority shareholder was not deprived
of his right to a proportionate share of the new stock issue at the new
par value, his rights having been protected by the issuance to him of
the additional shares arising from the stock split and subscription
warrants. The majority were not responsible for his failure (because
of lack of funds) to avail himself of his preemptive rights, and the
increase in the number of shares to be issued and the fixing of a date
on which subscription should be paid for in full was not an abuse
of discretion of the majority of shareholders and was not fraudulently
oppressive to the minority shareholder.
It must be recognized that the action of the minority shareholder
in organizing a competing corporation may have had a bearing on
the court's decision.
59 6 111. App.2d 461,128 N.E.2d 630 (1958).

60 342 111. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1951), petition for leave to appeal denied, 346 I11.
App.xiv (1952).

CORPORATIONS

Another case in which the minority shareholders attempted to use
their position to secure an advantage over the majority was Chapman
v. Barton."' When, at the annual meeting of shareholders, which had
customarily been conducted in an informal manner by oral vote, one
of the shareholders demanded a vote by ballot, the chairman stated
that he would not conduct a meeting without legal advice, and adjourned it until a lawyer could be consulted. The minority held a
meeting and elected directors whose right to act, as well as the right
of officers elected by them to act, was questioned in this litigation.
The court held that the minority shareholders could not complain
that the annual meeting was adjourned without electing directors
where no attempt was made to deprive the minority of their rights
and it was understood that there was to be another meeting for the
election of directors. Courts of equity do not look with favor upon
attempts of a minority group to seize control of a corporation by
trying to trap the majority which is without legal advice. The court
also held that corporate minutes prepared by each faction after the
annual meeting amounted to nothing more than self-serving statements
made out of court by interested parties, and could not be accorded
weight for either side against testimony of witnesses sworn and
examined in court.
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION OF DIRECTORS

Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp.62 is the first of three opinions involving the same parties and the same situation. To the complaint alleging misconduct on the part of the majority stockholders,
a verified answer was filed denying the material allegations of the
complaint and charges of wrongdoing. The order for a temporary
injunction was reversed on the ground that the court was satisfied
that the issues could not be determined without the hearing of testimony.
After the case was tried, the Appellate Court63 again reversed the
64
master and the chancellor on the authority of TVhite v. Stephens,
in which the following appeared:
61345 111. App. 110, 102 N.E.2d 565 (1951).
62 350 II.App. 293, 112 N.E.2d 716 (1953).
63 Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 21111. App.2d 538, 159 N.E.2d 31 (1959).
64 326 Ill.
528, 158 N.E. 101 (1927).
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There is no presumption in such case [where corporations with common
directors deal without an independent and disinterested majority] that the
contract is unfair or oppressive but the person attacking it must prove its
unfairness.65

On leave to appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court,

affirmed the chancellor, and held that since the transactions complained
of were between corporations, the common directors of which dominated both corporations, the defendant had the burden of establishing
the fairness of the transaction, and since the defendant had not sustained that burden, the Appellate Court's decision was erroneous.,,
The Supreme Court relied on Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co., 67 in which it was said:
The relation of directors to corporations is of such a fiduciary nature that
transactions between boards having common members are regarded as jealously by the law as are personal dealings between a director and his corporation,
and where the fairness of such transactions is challenged the burden is upon
those who would maintain them to show their entire fairness .... 68
THE POWER TO AMEND A CHARTER CHANGING PREFERENCES

OF PREFERRED SHAREHOLDERS

While the decision of Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker' 9 was decided
prior to the period dealt with in this article, it is a case of prime importance and worthy of a short comment. In that case, the corporation's
charter provided that the holders of preferred shares were entitled to
receive preference dividends and to enjoy other preferences in the
distribution of assets, etc. At a special shareholders meeting, all of
the shareholders, both common and preferred, except the complaining preferred shareholder, voted to amend the charter so that the
preferred shares would be non-cumulative as to future dividends, and
they cancelled all unpaid accumulated dividends. Statutory provisions
for passing the amendment were followed. The corporation then filed
its action for a declaratory judgment that the amendment to the charter was valid. The court held for the plaintiff and stated that the
claim of the dissenting preferred shareholder that his "vested" right
had been impaired or destroyed was without basis in law.
65

Id. at 533, 158 N.E. at 103.

66 Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 l1.2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960).
67 254 U.S. 590 (1921).
68 Id. at 599.
69 403 111.260,85 N.E.2d 722 (1949), Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 878 (1949).
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In a well-reasoned opinion, the court held that since the original
charter provided that the rights and preferences of the preferred
shares might be changed by a vote of two-thirds in amount of the
preferred shares and, of course, concurrence of the common shares,
both of which had been had, the amendment to the charter was valid
and did not violate any of the rights of the dissenting preferred shareholder. After reviewing the English cases and those in other United
States jurisdictions, the court, through Judge Wilson, said:
The same contract creating the right to accrued cumulative dividends may,
by other terms and conditions, render the right defeasible by appropriate action of the majority of the members of the corporation. Furthermore, although an amendment cancelling accrued dividends appears to have a retroactive effect, its actual operation is prospective only. The accrual of dividends
by the mere lapse of time does not alter the nature or character of the dividend rights of preferred stock. Where a corporation fails to declare a dividend
on its preferred stock, the only change effected is an enlargement of the size
or quantity of the right to dividends. The character of the right remains unchanged and continues to be prospective. Lastly, it should be observed that
the charter provision authorizing a change in the rights of the preferred stock
itself creates a contractual right in the shareholders and it is the validity of a
proper exercise of this right to change the defeasible right of the preferred
stock which is here sustained. 70
70 Id. at 283, 85 N.E.2d at 733.

